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ARGUMENT 
A. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Bank was a bona fide lender. 
Although the Bank contends in its Respondent's Brief that it has "set forth ample 
evidence establishing that at the time it obtained and recorded the Deeds of Trust, it was unaware 
of the Harrises' claims against the Subject Real Property" (Respondent's Brief, page 15), the 
evidence points to facts creating genuine disputes as to the Bank's notice. 
Contrary to the Bank's assertion on page 16 of its Respondent's Brief that the Harrises 
must prove two specific elements to defeat the Bank's contention that it was a good faith 
encumbrancer, the law directs otherwise. As noted in the Harrises' Appellants' Brief, good faith 
"means lack of actual or constructive knowledge .... " Benz v. D. L. Evans Bank, 37814 
(IDSCCI)(January 25, 2012). 
The district court below did not properly apply the standard for summary judgment when 
considering the question of the Bank's good faith and notice. The Harrises set forth numerous 
facts demonstrating genuine factual issues pertaining to the Bank's actual, constructive and 
inquiry notice. Nor did the district court below properly construe all such facts, and liberally 
apply all inferences from such facts in favor of the Harrises. I.R.C.P. 56. 
The trial court liberally construes the record in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. 
Tolmie Farms v. JR. Simplot Co., 124 Idaho 607, 609, 862 P.2d 299, 301 (1993); Doe v. 
Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 469, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986). If reasonable people could reach 
different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the motion must be 
denied. Featherston v. Allstate Insurance Co., 125 Idaho 840, 842,875 P.2d 937, 939 (1994). 
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Refuting completely the Bank's claim that it acted without notice of the Harrises' adverse 
claim to and interests in the subject property are the following glaring facts. Prior to the 
recording of the first admittedly invalid quitclaim deed from Darryl Harris to the Yost Trust, the 
Bank had requested and received a title report dated November 7, 2008. That title report showed 
the Harrises were the owners of the subject property. Despite the clear notice contained in that 
report, the Bank had the Yosts execute a deed of trust relating to the subject property. The Bank 
then recorded that deed of trust. Thus, the Bank asserted an encumbrance against the subject 
property at a time when it knew the Harrises were the titled owners and the Y osts had not title 
interest in the subject property. 
Further, the Bank wholly avoids in its brief mentioning any of the facts that it relied upon 
Yost's financial statements to support the signature loans it had made to Yost. Yost's financial 
statements manifest that his financial strength was 90% or more due to his interest in Palmer's 
Trigon or related entities. 
The Bank states it "had no reason to suspect that Palmer was dishonest and that Trigon 
was a Ponzi scheme because the Bank never made any loans to Palmer or Trigon and never held 
any accounts owned by them." (Respondent's Brief, page 18). The Bank pretends that hiding its 
head in the sand protects it from facts of which it had notice that Palmer's actions were suspect 
and that Yost's net worth based on Trigon's heralded financial strength demanded further 
scrutiny. 
Knowing that Yost was part of Palmer's Trigon business, the Bank asked Yost to have 
Palmer demonstrate with documents Trigon's financial position. Obviously, in making such a 
request, the Bank suspected both Palmer and TrigoR Indeed, the Bank had notice that some of its 
customers had experienced insufficient funds checks written on Trigon's account. Accepting the 
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Bank's request, Yost arranged for Palmer to meet with the Bank. Palmer brought in his purported 
financial documents. The Bank reviewed Palmer's documents but could not understand them. 
Additionally, prior to recording its deeds of trust with Yost, another customer of the Bank 
involved with Trigon presented to the Bank the contrived statement Palmer had created claiming 
that the Bank of America held millions of dollars for Trigon. The Bank recognized that the 
statement and the electronic message given when the listed telephone number was called were 
dubious. 
During the summer of 2008 Yost was in default of his signature loan at the Bank. Yost's 
explanation for the default was the absence of cash flow from Trigon. It was only after Yost's 
default in payment of his loans that the Bank pressured Yost to come up with collateral to secure 
the Bank's position, including obtaining title to the subject property. 
Seeking safe harbor in the bay of self-imposed ignorance, the Bank sidesteps the actual 
notice, constructive notice, and inquiry notice of facts and information defeating its status as a 
good faith encumbrancer. The Bank was on notice of facts demanding its reasonable diligence to 
investigate the true nature of the title to the subject property and Yost's connection to a clearly 
questionably investment scheme. The Bank's election to ignore facts does not save it from its 
legally imposed duty to investigate. Hill v. FederalLand Bank, 59 Idaho 136, 141, 80 P.2d 789, 
791 (1938); Whitworth v. Krueger, 98 Idaho 65, 558 P.2d 1026 (1976); Farrell v. Brown, 111 
Idaho 1027, 729 P.2d 1090 (Ct.App. 1986). 
There are genuine issues of material fact concerning the Bank's status as a good faith 
encumbrancer. The district court erred in granting summary judgment in the Bank's favor on its 
claim of being a good faith encumbrancer. 
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B. Lack of Consideration. 
Parol Evidence 
Relying upon Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170,898 P.2d 1081 (1995), the Bank contends the 
Hcrrrises did not present any admissible evidence to contradict the clear language of the corrected 
quitclaim deed. As in the district court, the BcUlk's reliance on Bliss is misplaced. 
Prefatorily, it is important to note that the district court correctly rejected as a matter of 
law the Bank's position that parol evidence was inadmissible to challenge the language of the 
corrected quitclaim deed. 
The court in Bliss based its holding entirely upon Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 484, 777 
P.2d 255 (1989). Hall did not deal with the issue of lack of consideration. Instead, the issue in 
Hall was whether transfer of a deed was in part gift rather than for value. Unquestionably, Hall 
and Bliss address whether parol evidence is admissible to challenge unambiguous language in a 
deed pertaining to the parties' intent and not whether parol evidence is admissible to prove lack 
of consideration. 
Both Hall and Bliss were distinguished for their limited application in Barrett v. Barrett, 
149 Idaho 21, 232 P.3d 799 (2010). In Barrett the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Although the trial court's interpretation of Hall and Bliss is understandable, we 
conclude that the language of a deed executed in the course of refinancing does 
not conclusively determine the character of property for purposes of a divorce 
action. Rather, the intention of the party or parties executing the deed is 
dispositive. Thus, neither I.e. § 55-606 nor the statute of frauds governs because 
the pertinent question is not the effectiveness of the deed. Although the trial 
judge, as the finder of fact, may consider a deed as evidence in determining intent, 
it is not the only evidence available to a judge considering the question of 
transmutation. 
Id. at 24. 
More important, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that where consideration for a deed 
is material to the issues, evidence of consideration is admissible. Consideration is not an issue 
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dealing with intent as expressed in the language of a deed. Consideration is the main factor for 
determining validity of the grant and delivery of a deed. Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 
P.3d 303 (2008); Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Northwest Yearly Meeting Pension 
Fund, 128 Idaho 539, 916 P.2d 1264 (1996)(lack of consideration may result in voiding of deed); 
McNabb v. Brewster, 75 Idaho 313,272 P.2d 298 (1954). 
Consequently, parol evidence is admissible. The uncontroverted testimony of Duane Yost 
and Darryl Harris established no consideration was given for the corrected quitclaim deed. 
Lack of Consideration 
Without factual basis, the Bank mischaracterizes the bargained for consideration for the 
subject property between the Harrises and Yost. The Bank opines that the consideration was a 
mutual exchange of promises. The facts prove otherwise. 
As part of an overall development plan, Yost was to pay not merely promise to pay -
the Harrises the sum of $800,000. In tum, the Harrises would convey to Yost title to the subject 
property; which property Yost, in tum, would convey to the development company. 
Acting on that agreement, Yost actually caused a transfer of what he thought was 
$800,000 from his Trigon account to the Harrises'Trigon account. Of course, as shown by the 
Affidavit of Wayne Klein, that transfer was purely paper and fiction. Nonetheless, Yost testified 
that believed he had fully performed by paying the Harrises the consideration of $800,000. 
The district court erroneously construed Yost's transfer of funds from his Trigon account 
to the Harrises' Trigon account as actual consideration because the Harrises had the "right to 
withdraw" those funds. In fact, the court concluded that the Harrises mt!st have received funds 
from Yost because the "Harrises received, or had access to, at least some ofthe $800,000. Again, 
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the district court misperceived the entirely false nature of the accounts Palmer "generated" in 
Trigon. 
Palmer did not actually have "accounts" for his investors in Trigon. His accounting 
merely represented as Klein described "investment credits." There was no actual cash. Palmer 
was operating a Ponzi scheme and any money paid to investors was taken from other investors. 
When Yost caused a transfer of $800,000 from his Trigon account to the Harrises' Trigon 
account, no actual funds were transferred. Although Yost may have believed his transfer of 
money was payment to the Harrises for the subject property, there was in fact no payment made. 
No consideration was given. Accordingly, Yost correctly testified in his deposition that in light 
of the fraud Palmer had committed Yost paid no consideration to the Harrises. 
The Bank urges a determination that the actual consideration for the subject property was 
Yost's promise to pay $800,000. There was no such promise. Nor do the facts support a finding 
that the bargained for consideration was Yost's promise to pay. 
Rather, the facts amply demonstrate that Yost believed he had paid $800,000 to the 
Harrises, not that he merely promised to pay. The Bank's reliance on the false notion that Yost's 
consideration was in the form of his promise to pay is wholly refuted by Yost's testimony, 
Yost's payment of $800,000 by transfer between Trigon accounts, and the actual bargained for 
consideration agreed to by the Harrises. 
In ruling on the cross motions for summary judgment, the district court reached an 
incorrect determination that Yost must have paid some consideration to the Harrises because the 
Harrises had received or had access to some funds in their Trigon account. The Harrises then 
moved for reconsideration supported with the affidavit of Wayne Klein. Klein's affidavit made it 
plain that the "investment credits" Yost transferred to the Harrises was nothing more than paper. 
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Faced with Klein's affidavit, the district court nevertheless determined Yost gave some 
consideration and, thus, there was a failure of consideration instead of lack of consideration. The 
district court erred. The district court's judgment should be reversed. 
Void Deed alld Good Faith Ellcumbrallcer 
The Bank asserts three cases from other states support its position that even if there was a 
lack of consideration it is protected as a bona fide encumbrancer for value. The Bank's position 
is unsound. 
First, the Bank cites Goodwin v. City of Dallas, 496 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
Texas appellate courts have held that a mere lack of consideration is generally not enough to 
void a deed. Watson v. Tipton, 274 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009). In addition to lack 
of consideration there must be fraud or undue influence in obtaining the deed. Uriarte v. Prieto, 
606 S.W.2d 22 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1 st Dist. 1980). 
The decisions from Texas are not in line with the abundant authority cited by the Harrises 
in their Appellant's Brief establishing that lack of consideration renders a deed void, not merely 
voidable. As noted in the Appellant's Brief, Idaho courts have acknowledged, albeit directly 
decided, that lack of consideration would render a deed void. The Bank has offered no 
authorities challenging the majority view as set forth in the Appellant's Brief. 
Second, the Bank cites First Interstate Bank of Sheridan v. First Wyoming Bank, NA. 
Sheridan, 762 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1988). However, the Bank failed to set out the full ruling of the 
court in First Interstate Bank. 
Wyoming has long recognized the defense of bona fide purchaser for value and 
the protections to which such a purchaser is entitled. Accordingly, the only 
question we need answer in disposing of this case is whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's finding that the Bank was a bona fide 
purchaser. 
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A bona fide purchaser is protected against infirmities in a deed which would 
render the deed voidable. The infirmities alleged by appellant fall into this 
category. While a void deed cannot pass title even infavor of an innocent 
purchaser or a bonafide encumbrancer for value, a deed only voidable can pass 
title and be relied upon and enforced by a bona fide purchaser. 
Id., 762 P.2d at 384 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, First Interstate Bank provides no support for the Bank's position. Instead, it 
clearly suppOlis the Harrises' position that a void deed cannot pass title even in favor of a good 
faith encumbrancer. 
Third, the Bank seeks authoritative support from Brown v. Johnson, 11 So.2d 713 
(La.App. 2 Cir.1942). Louisiana does not recognize the rule followed in Idaho that lack of 
consideration renders a deed void. Nor does Louisiana follow the same bona fide purchaser rule 
applied in Idaho. The court in Brown observed as follows. 
Neither fraud, nor want of consideration, nor secret equities between the parties, 
who have placed on the public records a title valid upon its face, can be urged 
against a bona fide purchaser for value, who has acted on the faith of such 
recorded title. 
It is also the law that all persons have constructive notice of the existence and 
contents of a recorded instrument affecting immovable property; and where such 
an instrument contains language that fairly puts a purchaser on inquiry as to the 
title and he does not avail himself of the means and facilities at hand to obtain 
knowledge of the true facts he is to be considered as having bought at his own risk 
and peril. 
Furthermore, as a condition precedent to good faith, a purchaser is not required to 
examine the public records for the purpose of determining whether or not the 
property's title is good and valid. Bad faith is not to be imputed to him merely 
because an examination of the public records would have disclosed a defect in his 
vendor's title. 
Id. 11 So.2dat716. 
Furthermore, the court in Brown determined there was consideration to support the deed 
in the initial transaction challenged on appeal. No other state appellate court has cited the Brown 
decision. 
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Thus, the authorities relied upon by the Bank provide no persuasive reasoning sustaining 
the Bank's argument that a void deed protects a good faith encumbrancer. 
Fraud by Palmer 
Finally, the Bank contends Palmer's conceded fraud cannot be considered when 
determining whether a voidable deed should be set aside. The authorities cited by the Bank do 
support is argument. 
Appellate courts in Texas and Missouri hold that evidence of fraud will render a deed 
voidable. A deed obtained by fraud is not absolutely void; rather, it is voidable and must be set 
aside in a judicial proceeding maintained by the defrauded party. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 
923 (1976); Deaton v. Rush, 252 S.W.2d 1025 (1923); Meiners v. Texas Osage Coop. Royalty 
Pool, Inc., 309 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Civ.App.-EI Paso 1958). 
Missouri follows a rule similar to Texas. 
We are mindful of the general rule that mereabsence of consideration is not 
sufficient to warrant relief by way of equitable cancellation of a deed in the 
absence of some additional circumstance creating an independent ground for 
granting cancellation, such as fraud or undue influence. But where a person has 
been induced to part with a thing of value for little or no consideration, equity will 
seize upon the slightest circumstance of fraud, duress, or mistake for the purpose 
of administering justice in the particular case. 
We hold that the absence of consideration for the special warranty deed, coupled 
with Blisard's misrepresentation that it was a quitclaim deed for the purpose of 
establishing that the fence line had been in place for many years, supplied ample 
grounds for the cancellation of the special warranty deed. 
City a/Gainesville v. Gilliland, 718 S.W.2d 553, 580 (Mo.App. S.D. 1986)(citations omitted). 
Although acknowledging Palmer committed fraud against Yost and the Harrises, the 
Bank suggests such third-party fraud cannot be the basis of voiding a deed. The decision in City 
a/Gainesville rejects the Bank's position. 
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If a deed is void for lack of consideration, the presence of fraud is a non-issue. However, 
in those states where lack of consideration renders a deed voidable, the presence of fraud will 
result in judicial determination that the deed was void. 
As the Missouri Appellate Court held above, "But where a person has been induced to 
part with a thing of value for little or no consideration, equity will seize upon the slightest 
circumstance of fraud ... for the purpose of administering justice in the particular case." Id. In 
the City a/Gainesville, a third party's fraud - Mr. Blisard - was the basis for judicial cancellation 
ofa deed. 
Consequently, the presence of fraud by a third party may be sufficient grounds for 
determining a deed should be voided. 
Yost believed he paid the Harrises $800,000. Yost was defrauded by Palmer where Yost 
did not in fact pay the Harrises $800,000. The Harrises were defrauded into initially believing 
Yost had made the $800,000 payment. At the time of the delivery of the corrected quitclaim 
deed, Darryl Harris was concerned about payment. Yost presented the fraudulent document 
Palmer had prepared purportedly showing Bank of America held millions of dollars for Trigon, 
which funds would be sufficient to cover Yost's consideration. 
Accordingly, in those jurisdictions where lack of consideration renders a deed voidable 
and not merely void, the presence of fraud surrounding the issuance of the deed leads to judicial 
cancellation of the deed. Such cancellation would result regardless of whether the fraud was 
committed by a third party. Cancellation of the con'ected quitclaim deed would eliminate the 
Bank's position as a good faith encumbrancer because no title was conveyed to which the Bank's 
interest could attach, 
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C. There was no delivery of the deed. 
In part the Bank suggests that parol evidence is not admissible to challenge delivery of a 
deed. The Bank's reliance on Whitney v. Dewey, 10 Idaho 633, 80 P. 1117 (1905) is misplaced. 
"Delivery in some form is absolutely essential" to the validity of a deed. 
"[D]elivery includes surrender and acceptance, and both are necessary to its 
completion." "[W]hether a deed has been delivered so as to pass title depends 
upon the intention of the parties." "The mere placing of a deed in the hands of the 
grantee does not necessarily constitute a delivery. The question is one of 
intention: whether the deed was then intended by the parties to take effect 
according to its terms." "[T]he evidence of delivery of a deed must come from 
without the deed. In other words, a deed does not upon its face show delivery, and 
therefore parol evidence is admissible to show such fact." "[T]he real test of the 
delivery of a deed is this: Did the grantor by his acts or words, or both, intend to 
divest himself of title? If so, the deed is delivered." 
Riley v. WR. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho 116, 123, 138 P.3d 316,323 (2006)(citations omitted). 
"A deed 'does not take effect as a deed until delivery with intent that it shall 
operate. The intent with which it is delivered is important. This restricts or enlarges the 
effect of the instrument. '" Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344-345, 179 P.3d 303, 
307-308 (2008)(citations omitted). Parol evidence is admissible to determine the intent of 
the grantor at the critical time of delivery. 
Ignoring the salient facts of Darryl Harris' intent, the Bank reaches the erroneous 
conclusion that, "The uncontroverted evidence can only be construed to show that Darryl 
intended to deliver the Corrected Quitclaim Deed to Duane." 
Pertinent to the question of the Harrises' intent are the following facts. The Harrises and 
Yost intended to development the subject property under Triad-Harris, LLC. Title to the property 
plmmed for development was to be held under that entity's name. No deed was prepared until the 
first quitclaim deed in November 2008. That deed was unquestionably faulty in several respects, 
including the grantee named as the Yost Trust and the signature only of Darryl Harris. 
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Meanwhile, concerns about Yost's and the Harrises' investments with Trigon grew in 
intensity and uncertainty. When Yost returned to Harris with the corrected quitclaim deed, Harris 
was reluctant due to the concern over receiving actual payment for the property. Yost then 
showed Harris the contrived statement from Bank of America purportedly showing Trigon had 
millions of dollars available. Harris then took the deed and later signed it. Harris testified that he 
signed the deed only upon assurance that payment would be made. 
Under the above facts, Harris had no intention of relinquishing title to his property 
without full payment. Harris did not intend to deliver the deed except on condition of full 
payment. Satisfaction of payment was assured to Harris through fraud. 
Accordingly, there was no delivery of the corrected quitclaim deed. The district court's 
judgment should be reversed. 
D. Idaho Code § 32-912 applies. 
The Bank recognizes that I.C. § 32-912 applies to void the corrected quitclaim deed. 
However, the Bank maintains that various forms of estoppel work to prevent Christine Harris 
from asserting the protections of the statute. 
Estoppel can only apply where the conduct of the non-consenting spouse is consistent 
with the validity of the disputed contract. See Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 711, 779 
P.2d 22,25 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Quasi-Estoppel 
"Quasi-estoppel prevents a party from successfully asserting a position inconsistent with 
a previously-taken position, with knowledge of the facts and of its rights, to the detriment of the 
person seeking to invoke it." Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 662, 962 
P.2d 1041,1046 (1998). 
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Christine Harris did not assert a position inconsistent with a previously-taken position. 
She has always maintained that the corrected quitclaim deed was signed without her knowledge 
and did not contain her signature. Indeed, the Bank cannot point to any facts showing it relied to 
its detriment on some position taken by Christine Harris. Christine Harris was not a party to the 
corrected quitclaim deed and did nothing to cause the Bank to think otherwise. 
Judicial Estoppel 
Curiously, the Bank suggests the default judgment the Harrises obtained against the 
Yosts operates is some fashion as judicial estoppel to the Harrises' defense of § 32-912. 
Judicial estoppel has no application to the present action. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits "a party from assuming a position in 
one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent 
proceeding .... " Generally when a litigant, through sworn statements, "obtains a 
judgment, advantage or consideration from one party, he will not thereafter, by 
repudiating such allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations 
or testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, 
arising out of the same transaction or subject matter." "Because judicial estoppel 
is an equitable doctrine existing to protect the dignity of the judicial process it is ' 
invoked by a court at its discretion." 
Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 748, 215 P.3d 457,468 
(2009), quoting, Riley v. WR. Holdings, LLe, 143 Idaho 116, 121-22, 138 P.3d 316,321-22 
(2006). 
There has been no other proceeding involving the Harrises, the Y osts and the Bank. In 
no other proceeding has Christine Harris taken the position that she signed the corrected 
quitclaim deed. 
Obtaining default judgment against the Y osts in the present action is not an event 
invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel against the Harrises for claiming application of § 32-
912 against the Bank. Rules of procedure recognize that alternative and conflicting claims may 
be raised without fear of judicial estoppel. LR.C.P. 8(e)(2). Under the Bank's analysis of judicial 
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estoppel, its amended complaint against Robert Crandall for damages from his alleged violation 
of notary obligations relating to the corrected quitclaim deed constitutes estoppel of its claims 
against the Harrises and the Yosts. 
Equitable Estoppel 
Equitable estoppel is a doctrine used to prevent application of certain defenses such as 
statutes oflimitation, Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho 323, 757 P.2d 188 (1987); Twin Falls Clinic 
& Hasp. Bldg. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,644 P.2d 341 (1982), or the defense of parol evidence 
and lack of agency to enforce an otherwise unenforceable agreement, Ogden v. Griffith, 149 
Idaho 489,236 P.3d 1249 (2010). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that equitable estoppel applies only where there is 
inequitable conduct by a party to a contract. Bunn v. Heritage Safe Co., 148 Idaho 760, 229 P.3d 
365 (2010). 
Neither Christine Harris nor Darryl Harris engaged in inequitable conduct as part of any 
contract or agreement with the Bank. The Harrises have not asserted any inequitable defenses to 
the Bank's claims. Christine Harris did not "conceal" the fact that her signature had been forged. 
There was no issue about her signature on the corrected quitclaim deed until this action was 
filed. 
Although the Bank argues it could not have known about the forgery because the deed 
had been notarized, the facts show otherwise. At a time prior to the signing of the corrected 
quitclaim deed, the Harrises appeared in person at the Bank and signed deeds of trust that the 
Bank notarized. Additionally, the Bank had on record a copy of the Harrises' account records 
including Christine Harrises' signature. The Bank "could have known" that Christine Harris did 
not sign the corrected quitclaim deed. 
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The Bank makes much of the existence of a notary on the quitclaim deed. However, the 
evidence is clear that Christine Harris did not sign the deed. The Bank's sole reliance on the 
existence of a notary is a position taken at its own peril and not caused by the Harrises. The Bank 
may have claim against the notary, but such claim does not result in equitable estoppel against 
the Harrises. 
Finally, for the reasons set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the Bank cannot assert estoppel 
in any manner against the Harrises, because the Harrises took no action preceding execution and 
recording of the corrected quitclaim deed on which estoppel can be based. 
Where estoppel does not apply, the protections of I.C. § 32-912 are available to the 
Harrises. The district court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment to the Bank. 
The district court's judgment should be reversed. 
E. The Bank's request for costs and attorney fees on appeal does not apply to the Harrises. 
As part of the amended judgment, the district court granted the Bank an award of costs 
and attorney fees against the Y osts. The Bank made no argument for an award of costs and 
attorney fees against the Harrises. 
On appeal, the Bank does not clarify that its request for costs and fees on appeal is 
directed against the Yosts and not the Harrises. However, the Bank cites to the note and deed of 
trust executed by the Y osts as authority for its request for costs and fees. Further, the Bank cites 
I.C. § 12-120(3) as statutory authority for an award of fees. 
To the extent the Bank is requested costs and fees on appeal against the Harrises, the 
Harrises object to the Bank's request. The Harrises are not party to any contract with the Bank. 
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The Harrises have no obligation under law or statute to pay costs and attorney fees to the BaIlic 
The Harrises are not party to any commercial transaction with the Banlc 
Accordingly, the Bank's request for costs and fees on appeal may be allowed as against 
the Y osts, but cannot be allowed against the Harrises. 
CONCLUSION 
There are genuine Issues of material fact as to whether the Bank was a good faith 
encumbrancer. 
The corrected quitclaim deed is void for lack of consideration. 
The corrected quitclaim deed is void in violation ofLC. § 32-912. 
The corrected quitclaim deed was not delivered. 
The district court's amended judgment should be reversed upon the grounds that the 
corrected quitclaim deed is void. 
Alternatively, the district court's amended judgment should be vacated upon the grounds 
that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the Bank is a good faith encumbrancer. 
Dated this ~ day of July 2012. 
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KIPP L. Manwaring 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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